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COMMUNICATION METHODS
OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY USA



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COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

November, 1954


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PREFACE

The purpose of this monograph is to make a general study of the methods of communication which have been utilized by the Communist Party in the United States during its 35 years' history.

This monograph is compiled from both public and confidential sources. The public sources will be found at the bottom of the pages on which they appear. The confidential sources are being retained by this Bureau.



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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

From its founding in 1919 until the late 1940's, the Communist Party in the United States generally relied on a variety of media to handle its communications -- telephone, telegraph, cable, mail, Communist publications, personal contact and courier. In 1946-47, however, the Communist Party, USA, began to become security conscious, and since then members and officials have been repeatedly admonished not to expose themselves to the dangers inherent in the use of such mediums of communication as the telephone, telegraph and mail because of a belief or conviction that authorities are intercepting them.

Operations of the Communist Party, USA, from its inception have been sustained principally by courier communication, and in the last seven years particularly, the Communist Party on a national and district scale has substantially increased and expanded its use of couriers, while correspondingly curtailing its reliance on the telephone, telegraph, cable and mail.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Such public utilities and services as the telephone, telegraph, cable and mail are no longer generally employed by the Communist Party,

USA, as media of communication because of the danger of interception by authorities.

2. Communist publications, both domestic and foreign, under cover of ideological and Aesopian language, contain directives, instructions, and orders for Party personnel.

3. Personal contact, as a reliable form of communication, is practiced wherever necessary or possible, especially by national, district and local leaders operating in the open and by lower level functionaries.

4. Today courier is the chief means whereby verbal and written messages, material, records, money, et cetera, are transmitted between the top hierarchy of the Communist Party and district and local leaders.

5. Confidential addresses or drops for mail, telegrams and cables and for telephone and courier communications are, and always have been, an extremely vital and integral part of the Communist communications system.

6. A radio-type communications system was explored by officials of the Communist Party in the late 1940's, but there is no evidence that any such system was ever adopted or installed.

7. No formal code or cipher system appears to be in current use by the Communist Party in the United States, although an open code, or double meaning language, is used extensively by Communists to safeguard their telephone conversations, written communications and records.

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I. COMMUNICATIONS IN GENERAL

Communications are the very lifeblood of any organization, especially one with national and international ramifications such as the Communist Party, USA. For this reason, since the days of its founding in 1919, the Communist Party in the United States has constantly endeavored to maintain safe, accurate and varied lines of communication.

Media Utilized

Until the late 1940's, the Communist Party, USA, generally relied on a variety of media -- telephone, telegraph, cable, mail, Communist publications, personal contact and courier -- to handle its communications. Each district of the Party had assigned to it several confidential addresses or drops¹ by which secret and important communications were transmitted to National Headquarters.² Separate and

¹A mail, telegram, cable, telephone or other type of confidential address or drop is a secret or cover address where confidential and secret mail, messages or other types of communications or material are received and where they are held or stored for safekeeping in order that they may be subsequently turned over to the person or persons for whom they are intended.

²National Headquarters of the Communist Party, USA, is frequently referred to by Communists as the "Center" or the "National Office." Since 1952, National Headquarters has been located at 268 Seventh Avenue, New York City. Before that, it briefly occupied quarters at 29 West 125th Street, New York City. Prior to 1951, the National Office was situated for nearly a quarter of a century at 35 East 12th Street, New York City.



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distinct confidential addresses or drops were designated for mail, telegrams, cables and telephone calls. In turn, National Headquarters had available to it similar drops by which communications of the same type were sent to each district.

It has been reported that, until recently, whenever an important or urgent question or problem had to be referred to National Headquarters by a district, a telegram was dispatched to a telegraph drop in New York City. The message contained in the telegram was apparently innocuous in nature but its purpose was to place the National Office on notice that a high-level answer or decision was desired. The telegram included a time which indicated that a follow-up telephone call to a telephone drop would be forthcoming from the inquiring district. When the message arrived at the telegraph drop, a courier or "legman" took the message to the National Office where a top functionary made himself available to answer the question at the telephone drop at the time specified in the telegram.

Development of Security Consciousness

The Communist Party, USA, began to become security conscious in 1946-47. When security measures were first introduced by the Party, officials were admonished, for example, not to make any telephone calls

from Communist Party offices and not to transact any Party business over the telephone. Such precautions for awhile seemed to run in cycles. For a few days, emphasis was placed on these precautions but thereafter functionaries became careless and vigilance was relaxed. After grave breaches in security were committed and the need for observing the previously established safeguards became obvious, another period of strict adherence was again placed in effect.

Extreme security consciousness was precipitated in early November, 1947, following a press conference in Los Angeles, California, by O. John Rogge, former Assistant Attorney General of the United States. Rogge alleged that there would be a "dramatic round-up of dozens of Communist leaders and fellow travellers," timed to coincide with the convening of a special session of Congress later that month. Party officials believed this information to be authentic and promptly issued instructions for stringent precautions in all districts.

Immediately following Rogge's news conference, according to a reliable source, Robert Thompson, a member of the National Board of the Communist Party, USA, communicated with Archie Brown, a California State Communist Party official. Thompson indicated that his "kid" was "sick" and that "the crisis" was likely to come in the next 12 to 24 hours.

Other Communist Party districts throughout the country received similar "sick" messages. In each instance, the message dealt with the alleged illness of an aunt, an uncle or a cousin of the individual called, and recommended that this individual should spend at least two days with the "ill" relative. As a consequence, Communist leaders went into hiding; books and records of all types were destroyed or hidden; bank accounts were closed and bail funds established.

Consideration in Congress of the Mundt-Nixon Bill in 1948, and the subsequent passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950, together with numerous trials and convictions of national and district Communist Party leaders for violation of the Smith Act, made the Party more acutely security conscious than before and compelled it to go underground to a considerable extent. Actually, however, even when the Communist Party in the United States has been legal or aboveground, Communists have always engaged in organized illegal or underground activity since the Party's inception. By the end of 1949, the Party was in the process of taking serious and systematic steps toward expanding its underground apparatus, all the while clinging tenaciously to its legal or aboveground organization. Thus, by June, 1951, when the Supreme Court verified the constitutionality of the Smith Act, the Communist Party had assumed a basically underground status.

During the first year of the Party's underground operations, communication was slow and erratic, although after this initial period liaison and coordination improved. At the present time, communications continue to constitute one of the principal problems in the operational procedures of the underground.

Since November, 1947, no records of any importance or significance have been maintained in national, district or local headquarters of the Party. Vital books and records are now in the custody of Party members in an underground capacity and are kept under extreme security precautions. The most important records are now in code and are hidden, and the transfer and transmittal of records and funds are accomplished through the extensive employment of couriers and contacts.

Since 1946-47, Party personnel have been repeatedly admonished not to expose themselves to the dangers inherent in the use of such communication media as the telephone, telegraph and mail in contacting one another, and have been instructed to employ slower but more secure means.

Communications System Personnel

Before the Party went underground, the communications system of National Headquarters of the Communist Party was said to have been directed and coordinated by two individuals, namely, Dora



Lifschitz and Manya Reiss, both Party members of long standing.

Dora Lifschitz left the United States in the latter part of 1951 for Poland under voluntary deportation, while Manya Reiss is reported to be now living in the Soviet Union.

Max Kitzes, office manager of National Headquarters for a number of years, was reported to be in charge of mail drops and to handle other aspects of communication between the National Office and the districts until his death in November, 1947. As office manager, he frequently used the alias "A. Benson."

After Kitzes' death, Jack Kling and Betty Gannett, then respectively National Treasurer and Assistant Organization Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, allegedly took over supervision of drop material.

Lement Harris is also said to be a key person handling communications for the Party. He has served as a channel for pickups from mail drops for the National Office. According to a reliable source, Harris was for years a confidante of William Weiner who, until his death in February, 1954, reputedly controlled and directed the Communist Party's fiscal policies and financial program.

Another "contact" man for Weiner and reported to be a key person in Party communications between open and underground personnel, especially with the so-called "unavailables," is Isadore Wofsy.

Both Harris and Wofsy are old-time Communists who have long been in the top hierarchy of the Party.

II. TELEPHONE

For a number of years, until after World War II, considerable Party activities were discussed and Party business was transacted over the telephone, sometimes freely, sometimes guardedly, usually depending on the persons conversing. Each district had at least one unlisted telephone number which it could use. All telephone calls between national and district officials were prearranged.

Telephones Believed Tapped

Party officials have long taken it for granted that telephones in Party offices are tapped and monitored, and as a consequence have ordered periodic searches and examinations of their telephones to determine whether they actually are tapped. In 1947, for example, telephones in National Headquarters were allegedly examined by two comrades, supposed to be telephone company employees, who concluded that the instruments were being tapped. Thereafter, all personnel in the National Office were warned of this discovery. Again, in 1952, an electrical engineer is said to have informed Party officials that tests made by him showed telephones in National Headquarters to be tapped.



Use of Public Telephones

In view of their suspicions or convictions that their office telephones were tapped and monitored, Party officials and office employees

established the practice of making habitual use of public telephones in the vicinity of headquarters. Louis F. Budenz, a former Communist, has said that when he was managing editor of the Daily Worker during the early 1940's, he came to be a frequent inhabitant of pay telephone booths near Party Headquarters in New York City. One day he would walk around the corner to a drug store in University Place, where there were only two booths. The next day, he would stroll over to a Schulte cigar store in University Square. Then again, he would go to a tavern opposite the Hotel Albert. According to Budenz, the outside telephone booth was as much a part of the Communist communications system for him as the private line from his desk in the Daily Worker office to the National Office of the Party on the ninth floor of the same building.¹

The Daily Worker is an east coast Communist newspaper.

Public telephone booths in Ben's Luncheonette and in Ohrbach's Department Store, both located only a block from the Communist Party building in New York City, were often utilized by Party personnel for calls they considered too confidential to make from their own telephones.

Security Measures Adopted

At one period in the 1940's, Party members reportedly believed that unlisted telephones were safer than listed ones. Later, party lines were deemed desirable as it was felt that if other parties could be heard using the

¹ Louis Francis Budenz, Men Without Faces (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 82.

line, the line was probably not tapped, but if no other party was audible, the telephone undoubtedly was tapped.

By 1946-47, the Communist Party, USA, with emphasis on greater vigilance, took steps to tighten security in every way possible. As a result of these measures, the use of the telephone became progressively less frequent and increasingly more circumspect.

In one large west coast city, in early 1947, the Communist Party proposed, among other security measures, that outgoing calls were not to be made from the Party's offices in that particular city and that no business was to be discussed over any telephone. The reason for these rules was the belief that telephones in the Party's offices, in the homes of Party leaders, and in the offices of unions and "progressive" organizations, were tapped and that anything that was said over the telephone ultimately found its way into the files of the FBI. The Party indicated that it was better to lean over backwards and not use the telephone at all for Party business rather than take the chance "to say the proper things and avoid saying the improper things."

By the end of 1949, in district and local Communist Party headquarters throughout the country, there was markedly less business being transacted and fewer names being mentioned on the telephone than ever



before. Telephones were used mostly for making appointments. Outside pay stations were utilized almost exclusively. Long distance calls were made at isolated places. Often officials and members would use the telephones of neighbors rather than their own. Code words and double talk were employed. Yiddish, Russian and other foreign tongues were frequently resorted to in telephone conversations.

A club organizer in a midwestern state in the Summer of 1950 was so fearful that members of his club might make some indiscreet remark over the telephone that he is said to have ordered the telephones removed from the homes of all members.

At the 15th National Convention of the Communist Party, USA, which was held in New York City in December, 1950, delegates and visitors were instructed, among other things, not to use the public booths in the hall where the convention was being held or in any building adjacent thereto.

During this period, fictitious names began to be used and meetings and contacts were arranged in the guise of casual and innocuous conversation, such as an invitation to lunch at a particular time.

One group of members in New York City was told that in the event something out of the way was said by one member during the course of a telephone conversation, the member hearing such a statement should immediately hang up so that the speaker who had committed the indiscretion would understand and promptly check up on himself.

Some Party functionaries, in making contact with members, would send a third person to a member's home with a note telling the member to communicate with the functionary by calling a certain pay station at a designated time when the functionary would be awaiting the call. In other instances, Party officials told members to call them at their homes from a coin telephone, leaving the number of the public telephone. The official called then would leave his home and call this public telephone from another pay booth. In using pay stations, Party personnel were warned not to use the same telephone more than once.

In the period after 1946-47, when Party personnel suspected that their office and residential telephones were tapped, various safeguards were taken by them to protect themselves during telephone conversations and at meetings in rooms in which telephones were located. Among these precautions were the following:

A metronome would be placed next to the telephone in the belief that its ticking would garble the conversation so that it would be incomprehensible to a wire tapper.

The telephone's transmitter and receiver would be covered with a pillow and a coat then placed over the entire instrument to deaden reception and make any conversation inaudible.

Speakers would write names, dates and places in longhand on pieces of paper and hand them to others in the room. Thereafter, the paper would be destroyed.

The mouthpiece of the telephone would be disconnected or the entire instrument would be placed in a desk drawer.

Some members adopted unique procedures in receiving emergency telephone calls. One county official in a large eastern city made it a practice not to answer the telephone when it rang, and instead permitted it to ring for a long time. If the individual calling hung up but called back immediately, the official would know it was an emergency call and would then answer it.

In another city, Party members were told to allow the telephone to ring for a lengthy period, then lift up the receiver and put it down, which would be a signal that the recipient and the caller would meet in a certain spot at a specified time.

There is never a time, even at important national, district and local conventions, conferences or meetings, when the entire leadership is present in the same place. This is a security measure long practiced. After commencement of the New York trial of the 11 Communist leaders in January, 1949, the Party was reported to have instituted training periods for full-time functionaries down to county and sectional

levels. As part of this training, each official was required to "hide out" for a one- or two-week period. It was the functionary's responsibility to locate his own hideout and to arrange for a telephone drop by which Party officials could communicate with him if necessary. Each official selected his own telephone drop, usually a housewife because she would be at home most of the time. The functionary would advise the appropriate official as to the identity and telephone number of his drop, and then he would keep in touch with this drop for messages.

In 1949, the Communist Party is reported to have employed a telephone relay system which operated in the following manner: the National Office, for instance, wishing to contact the Michigan district in Detroit by telephone, would use the residential telephone of a reliable comrade in New York City. Calls would then be placed to two stopover stations, the message being transmitted to the first station, then to a second and henceforth to a third telephone drop.

III. TELEGRAPH AND CABLE

There was a standing joke in the American Communist Party in its early days, according to Benjamin Gitlow, which ran as follows: Why was the Communist Party like the Brooklyn Bridge? The answer was because it was suspended on cables from Moscow and to Moscow.

Gitlow was a charter member of the Communist Party in the United States and was a top leader until his expulsion in 1929.

Used Extensively in Past

During this early period, Gitlow said, many lengthy cables, costing thousands of dollars, were received by the Communist Party, USA, from the Communist International (commonly referred to as the Comintern) and from American Communist leaders in Moscow, while numerous cables were sent by the Communist Party in the United States to the Communist International. These cables dealt with intimate American Communist Party matters and decisions of the Comintern in reference to them. Leaders of American Communist factions, according to Gitlow, travelled continually to and from Moscow during the first decade of the Party's existence and as a result kept the wires to Moscow hot with cables informing the Comintern in detail of everything that transpired in the Communist Party, USA.

Gitlow stated that some of the official cables sent to Moscow concerning American Communist Party activities were in code and many were not, even though they carried some of the Party's most confidential matters. These cables were supplemented by letters and reports. In return, the Party would receive cables officially from Moscow addressed to the Party and unofficially from various American caucus representatives in Moscow. Many of these latter cables were written in cryptic language.¹

Considerable funds destined for the United States were transferred by cable from Germany or England, Gitlow said. It was Moscow's custom never to send money directly from Russia to the United States by cable or otherwise. Special offices were set up and maintained in Germany and England which handled the transfer of funds. An American Communist kept a list of confidential cable addresses or drops in the United States and Canada to which money from the Comintern was sent. Funds sent to these drops were collected and turned over to appropriate Party officials.

Along with telephone and mail drops, National Communist Party Headquarters also possessed telegraph and cable drops. The districts similarly maintained telegraph drops. As mentioned heretofore, whenever an important and urgent question or problem was presented to

¹ Benjamin Gitlow, I Confess (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1940), pp. 187, 403.

the National Office by a district, a telegram would ordinarily be dispatched to a telegraph drop in New York City thus serving to place the National Office on notice that a high-level decision was desired and that a subsequent follow-up call to a telephone drop in New York City could be expected from the inquiring district.

A telegraph office was maintained by Western Union in the offices of the Daily Worker on the eighth floor of 35 East 12th Street, New York City, from the early 1930's until 1948. This Western Union office handled a volume of incoming and outgoing telegrams from National Headquarters of the Communist Party as well as incoming and outgoing telegrams, cablegrams and radiograms to and from the Daily Worker.

Now Considered Security Threat

After the Party became security conscious in 1946-47, the Party began to regard the use of the telegraph as a threat to security and officials and members were cautioned to cease utilizing this form of communication. As an illustration, delegates and visitors to the 15th National Convention of the Communist Party, USA, which was held in New York City in December, 1950, were instructed, among other things, not to send wires from the convention hall or anywhere nearby.

IV. MAIL

Volume Formerly Heavy

During the 1920's, Gitlow has stated, voluminous mail was exchanged between the Comintern in Moscow and the American Communist Party in the form of reports, resolutions and statements. By mail, he said, copies of minutes and stenographic transcripts of meetings of the Political Committee of the Communist Party, USA, were dispatched to Moscow, while American Communist leaders in Moscow wrote confidential letters to their colleagues back in the United States.

Hundreds of reports from all over the country came every day to National Headquarters of the Communist Party during the time Louis F. Budenz was managing editor of the Daily Worker. He said that some of these reports arrived from their source through the United States mails, and were addressed to the Communist Party, USA, at 35 East 12th Street, New York City. But many, he recalled, were brought to the National Office by hand, having first been received at the home of some comrade. He said that a number of these secret, confidential mail drops, such as the home address of a Party secretarial worker, were always maintained.¹

¹Louis Francis Budenz, This Is My Story (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947), pp. 128-129.

Use of Drops

For a number of years, the Communist Party, USA, has rented Post Office Box 87, Cooper Station, New York 3, New York, as a repository for receiving routine incoming mail. But for an equal period of time, important and confidential mail has never been channeled through this box. Instead, the National Office has maintained a series of mail drops to which secret and confidential mail is forwarded. There are separate and distinct drops for routine, air and special delivery mail. Each district and local organization of the Party also has similar mail drops at its disposal.

Mail transmitted through drops is invariably sent under a double cover. The outer envelope is addressed to the mail drop, while the inner envelope bears the name or initials of the person for whom the document is intended. Both inner and outer envelopes are usually plain and are sealed with Scotch tape as insurance against tampering. Occasionally, secret letters are enclosed in the stationery of business concerns in order to mislead postal or other governmental authorities into believing that such mail is nothing more than ordinary business correspondence.

During the period Budenz was stationed in the National Headquarters building in New York City, employees of the National Office handled the mailing of regular mail and mail destined for drops.

Regular mail was taken to one post office station and drop mail to another.

The National Office has frequently complained to the various districts as to the manner in which the districts forwarded their mail to National Headquarters. Max Kitzes, office manager of National Headquarters, in late 1944 informed one district that two transfers had been received addressed to John Williamson, National Secretary of the Communist Political Association.¹ Kitzes reminded this district that it was not supposed to do that and insisted that such a bad practice be remedied in the future.

A year and a half later, Williamson, then National Labor Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, cautioned all districts to exercise "better judgment" in the writing of letters to the National Office and within the districts themselves, observing that "some comrades seem to forget the political conditions under which we are living."

Security Measures Invoked

After 1946-47, the Party assumed that mail was being intercepted and use of the mails in furtherance of Party business commenced to decline. In early 1947, the districts were informed that only special delivery letters were to be sent directly to National Headquarters at

¹From May, 1944, until July, 1945, the Communist Party, USA was known as the Communist Political Association.

35 East 12th Street, New York City.

A little later, the Communist Party in a western city proposed, among other security recommendations, that no communications should be mailed from Party headquarters in that particular city except in great quantities; that these should be dispersed in various mail boxes in the vicinity of headquarters; that no return address should be placed on the envelopes; that the text of communications to club members should be made to read as if they referred to a bridge or social club; that every club should dispatch a member to come to county headquarters on Wednesday afternoon after three o'clock to pick up material and communications held in the office for it; and that important letters should be delivered personally. The reason for these rules was the belief that postal or other governmental authorities were opening some mail and might soon extend their operations to a wholesale examination of mail.

In the Spring of 1948, the Communist Party in a middle western city directed that Party headquarters in that city should not address any mail to its various sections. Instead, each section was to provide a courier who was to call at headquarters to pick up material for his section. Party personnel were also instructed that Party mailing lists in the future would distinguish between Party and non-Party communications, the latter being addressed merely as "Dear Friend."

By 1949, mailed announcements were no longer utilized to notify Party personnel of meetings and other affairs. Instead, group captains personally contacted the four or five comrades in their groups to advise them.

The use of mail as a vehicle for communication diminished markedly from 1949 on, while utilization of the services of couriers increased tremendously. At the present time, only a small amount of inconsequential, routine mail -- usually second-class matter and advertisements -- is received directly at National Headquarters or through its post-office box. A number of districts in recent years have surrendered the post-office boxes they formerly maintained. Some Party leaders in various localities, however, have retained boxes in their own names in which they receive routine mail and publications. Party officials in a Rocky Mountain state in 1953 allegedly corresponded with one another by having mail directed to them at general delivery windows under fictitious names.

Use of the mails is resorted to nowadays in emergencies where absolutely no other channel is open for making contact. Every effort is made in advance to guard against such emergencies so that mail can be completely avoided.

Where mail is used, the message is thoroughly disguised in order to safeguard the real purpose of the communication in the event its

contents should be read by some outside person. Such mail will contain no names or addresses, nor will meeting places be mentioned. Where a date or time has to be indicated, the message will not contain the real date and time but will, with appropriate forethought, provide for the addition or subtraction of a certain number for the date and time contained in the message. To the extent that a place is involved, this will be agreed upon in advance so as not to be included in the message.

With respect to mail between underground members and their families, it is not usually sent oftener than once a month. Between the sender and the receiver, there is ordinarily a minimum of two steps in between; that is, from the sender to another person to still another person to the final receiver. This is done to preclude any break through and interception by a government agency.

Inasmuch as mail is employed so infrequently at the present time, underground personnel usually make it a practice of sending a letter of no special significance through their particular mail apparatus about once every six weeks to insure that the system is in good functioning condition.

V. CONFIDENTIAL AND SECURITY ADDRESSES

Mail, Telephone, Telegraph and Cable Drops

Mail, telephone, telegraph, cable and other types of drops are, and always have been, an extremely vital and integral part of the Communist communications system. A former Comintern agent has told how, in the 1920's and 1930's, Communist Parties and Communist organizations abroad corresponded with the American Communist Party by mail directed to drops in the United States. The envelopes containing such mail would bear nonexistent return addresses and the contents would be so signed or marked that National Communist Party Headquarters in the United States would recognize the sender.

Soviet funds earmarked for the United States, as previously mentioned, found their way to the American Communist Party through cable drops located in the United States and Canada.

Correspondence from officials of the Labor Progressive Party of Canada to leaders of the Communist Party, USA, has long been reported to be mailed to drops in American cities or towns situated near the Canadian border and remailed from these localities to drops in New York City.¹

¹The Labor Progressive Party of Canada was formerly the Communist Party of Canada.

A Young Communist League official in Canada once sent a letter to a drop in Niagara Falls, New York, with a request that it be mailed at that point to another drop in New York City. The letter told of the imminent visit to New York City of a member of the Canadian Communist Party. The writer asked the ultimate recipient to make arrangements for this member to see a certain top official of the Young Communist League in the United States.

The Young Communist League has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

In August, 1940, Leon Trotsky, the political rival of Joseph Stalin, was murdered in his home near Mexico City by an individual who claimed to be Jacques Mornard, also known as Frank Jacson. During 1942-43, a series of letters from the New York City area to Mexico City and from Mexico to New York were intercepted by the United States Office of Censorship. On examination of these letters, it was determined that they contained cipher messages in invisible ink. When deciphered they were found to relate to the efforts of persons in the United States and in Mexico to free Frank Jacson, the convicted killer of Trotsky, from his Mexican prison.

An extensive and elaborate system of mail drops was used in this correspondence. Several individuals in the United States who served

...as drops were ascertained to be either Communist Party members or sympathizers.¹

In the past, National Headquarters of the Party and the respective districts had available a number of mail drops which were used for correspondence relating to dues, membership, organizational work, educational matters, et cetera. Only routine material, such as public appearances, dates of rallies, and similar data, was sent directly to Party headquarters.

According to a reliable source, confidential mailing addresses employed by the National Office used to be distributed to district organizers when they came to New York City for an important meeting or conference. At that time, the National Organizational Secretary of the Party would meet with each district organizer and present him with a slip of paper containing a time and an address. The district organizer was orally advised to contact a certain national functionary at the specified address during a recess in the meeting. The functionary would spend about an hour with the organizer and would then give him the names and addresses of drops to be used for mail, messages and other types of communications destined for National Headquarters.

¹ American Aspects of Assassination of Leon Trotsky. U.S. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. V, X.

A separate apparatus is alleged to have formerly directed and handled the confidential mailing system in New York, but in such large districts as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois and California, the district organizer ordinarily designated the organizational secretary to be in charge. In some districts, especially the smaller ones, office employees were entrusted to handle the drops.

Until his death in November, 1947, Max Kitzes was office manager of National Communist Party Headquarters and reputedly was in charge of mail drops for the National Office. He is said to have been assisted in this work by the following members of the National Office staff: Sarah Krenik, his assistant; Sarah Scherer, chief stenographer; Carl Reinstein, receptionist; Phil Cabot, a clerk; and Carl Dorfman, aid to William Z. Foster, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA.

For security reasons, mail drops in New York City and in the districts are changed periodically. Other precautions are also taken. The National Office has told district leaders that when a district notified National Headquarters to stop using a certain name and address, the record of it was destroyed and if the district desired to employ it again at some later date, the National Office had to be advised anew as to the complete name and address.

Double envelopes are generally used in mail drop communications. They are addressed in such a manner that the person who

receives them will recognize them as Party mail and set them aside knowing they are to be held for a certain person or persons, thus eliminating the possibility they might be opened by mistake. A false middle initial inserted in the name of the addressee indicates that this mail is not intended for him but is to be passed on to a person known to the addressee. If, by way of illustration, a drop's name is "Rose Cohen," Party mail would be addressed to her as "Rose S. Cohen" or some similar variation. Letters contained in the inner envelope are either remailed to the person intended or delivered to him in person or by courier.

One Communist Party functionary in the underground in Los Angeles, California, was so wary that, when he desired to communicate with other members in the same city, he would forward letters to them to a New York City drop for posting in New York City.

In the latter part of 1949, according to a reliable source, Andrew Remes, Chairman of the Wisconsin Communist Party, was assigned by the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, to contact trusted professional people -- doctors, lawyers, dentists -- whose offices could be utilized for mail drops or meeting places. This source reported that during the same period, the Communist underground in New York began to organize a clandestine mail system on every level.



Two comrades were assigned to ascertain names and addresses of loyal comrades whose residences could be used as mail drops or hiding places. These comrades, after obtaining the names and addresses of those whose homes could be so used, allegedly turned over some 50 or 60 names, in sealed envelopes, to a New York State Communist Party official.

Not all drops are members of the Communist Party but in the great majority of cases they are. Generally, drops are trusted, obscure, rank-and-file comrades whose chief duty and function in the Party is to serve as drops.

Since mail goes through post-office channels believed by Communists to be easily accessible to governmental authorities, the places selected as mail drops are extremely carefully chosen. Particular stress is placed on the reliability of the individuals so selected, as well as whether the place may be under the scrutiny of the Government.

Before the Party became so security conscious, the residence addresses of Communist Party officials and office employees were frequently used as drops. Wives and relatives of Communist leaders similarly have functioned as drops. A Communist Party leader in a Midwestern state used to send letters to the National Office by mailing them to his daughter, a Party member, who lived in New York City, with instructions for her to personally deliver the communications to National Headquarters.

Officials of Communist front organizations have been known to act as mail drops. In 1947, for instance, an American Youth for Democracy leader in New York was utilized as a mail drop.

American Youth for Democracy, which was the successor to the Young Communist League, has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Among the diverse types of individuals, stores and offices that have been utilized as mail drops by the Communist Party, nationally and in the districts, at one time or another in the past, are the following: a corset shop, a doctor, a cleaning establishment, a tailor shop, an advertising firm, a hardware store, a boardinghouse proprietor, a stenographer in a Communist-dominated union, an antique shop, an electric supply company, a gift shop, a dentist, a jewelry store, a food products shop, a private school and an attorney.

A mail drop used by National Communist Party Headquarters for a number of years was Union Square Optical Service, Incorporated, located at 147 Fourth Avenue, New York City, only several blocks from the Communist Party building at 35 East 12th Street. This firm was one of the approved opticians for the International Workers Order, which organization has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450. William Vogel, a Communist Party member, and




Nathan Shaffer, who was active in the IWO, were co-owners.

Sometime prior to March, 1944, Max Kitzes, Communist Party office manager, notified all districts that henceforth all transfers and other confidential mail should be directed to Union Square Optical Service. The notice added that any other addresses the districts might have were voided. Thereafter, until Shaffer's death in the Spring of 1951, this firm functioned as an active mail drop on behalf of the Communist Party. There were several extended periods, however, during which this drop appeared to be totally inactive.

It is reliably reported that material which was funneled through this drop consisted of membership and transfer correspondence and inquiries from and between districts. Nathan Shaffer handled all the drop material himself and personally removed the outer envelopes from such letters. Occasionally, Shaffer telephoned Kitzes to tell the latter of the receipt of some mail. As a general rule, Kitzes himself picked up the mail from Shaffer.

In 1950, Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, is known to have sent and received mail by messenger through Union Square Optical Service. Dennis' emissary dealt directly with Shaffer.



Security Return Addresses

The name and address of a trusted Party member or sympathizer is ordinarily placed on outgoing Party mail, apparently for two reasons:

- (1) As a flag to the receiving drop that the communication is Party mail and should be delivered to the proper Party person.
- (2) That in the event the letter is misdirected or mislaid, it will be returned to someone who will recognize it for what it is and return it to the proper Party person.

In the past, the home addresses of Party office employees have been frequently used as security return addresses by the National Office and by the districts.

Message, Transfer and Storage Drops

Wide use is made by Communists, especially those in the underground, of message or contact drops and depots or stations where material, records, money, information, et cetera, can be deposited, transferred or stored. Messages are frequently transmitted by double cover, the inner envelope bearing a notation for whom it is intended. Material picked up from one drop is often taken to another drop where it is stored.



Drops such as these are usually public in character. A variety of stores, offices and establishments, whose owners or proprietors were Communists, have acted as message, transfer and storage drops for Communist leaders. Among them have been drug stores, a liquor store, restaurants, a dentist's office, a candy store, a shoe repair shop and Communist book stores.



VI. COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS

In a limited sense, perhaps, Communist publications can be considered as a form of open code, which will be described later in this paper. However, Communist publications are being treated here separately for the reason that open code pertains primarily to correspondence and conversation rather than to published material.

One informed source has stated that the necessity today for the presence of a Comintern representative in the United States in order to furnish Soviet direction no longer exists. Under present conditions, this source observed, all that is required is for a prominent Communist official abroad to write an article or deliver a speech and Communist leaders everywhere in the world examine and analyze the article or speech for its true meaning and intent.

According to this source, the American Communist Party receives its broad policy in this manner, following the dictates and instructions laid down and readily apparent in newspapers and periodicals published in Moscow and elsewhere in Communist-ruled countries. American Communist leaders, this source said, have only to study, dissect, interpret and apply the directives and orders contained in these publications.

Louis F. Budenz has stated that an editor of a Communist publication has to be skilled and adept in the Communist "code" in order to unravel and interpret rapidly the practical political instructions sent by Moscow under cover of ideological and Aesopian language contained in the books, publications and documents which are published in Moscow in many languages -- including English -- for the guidance and direction of Communists in the United States and elsewhere. Budenz said:

"There are two parts to this code of instructions -- each of them highly important. The first division consists of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, 'the great Marxist classics,' and those auxiliary works which serve as footnotes or additions to these classics. Their purpose is to inflame the party member with zeal, to provide him with the ideas that will confirm his devotion to the cause, and to steel him for the objective of overthrowing the government of his country.

"The second division comprises the theoretical and practical organs provided as sources of direction and information. They explain and develop the immediate line which the party is following. Outstanding among these is the New Times, arriving here in English as an alleged supplement of the Moscow newspaper Trud: it is the successor in part of The Communist International magazine, which of course had to end when the Communist International supposedly ceased to exist. With that now goes the Cominform's publication, recently issued from Bucharest, and which under the guise of giving the official reports of the satellite states conveys a wider understanding of current tactics. Next there is The Bolshevik, the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 'the model party' for all other Communist groups, and therefore read with the utmost respect and attention.

Then there is Political Affairs, the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the United States, formerly called The Communist.

"As a Red reportorial organ, although also containing directives, there is available World News and Views. This is a successor to the former famous International Press Correspondence.

"Every leading Communist keeps himself abreast of all these publications, studying them carefully, line by line, to catch the nuance and emphasis of each quotation or expression. From that he learns with rare exactitude just what Moscow wants of his party and of him."

• • • • •
"The Aesopian language of the Communists is indeed the cleverest device ever hit upon to conceal subversive intentions and instructions...."¹

Other reliable sources have indicated that all members of the Communist Party in the United States assiduously and avidly read the Daily Worker, The Worker and Political Affairs as important, firsthand sources of information relative to the Party's policies and line. Members are cognizant of the fact that many articles in these publications embody directives and instructions from the top echelon to the membership and that they must be able to read between the lines in order to ascertain their true purpose and design.

The Worker is the Sunday edition of the Daily Worker.

Political Affairs is an "official Communist Party monthly theoretical organ," according to the Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities in its Report No. 1920, dated May 11, 1948, pages 5 and 36.

¹Budenz, Men Without Faces, pp. 82-84.

VII. PERSONAL CONTACT

Personal contact by Party personnel is, of course, recognized as an accurate form of communication and is resorted to wherever necessary or possible, especially by national, district and local leaders operating in the open and by lower level functionaries. Group captains make it a practice of maintaining contact with their group members on a personal basis.

In effecting personal contact in furtherance of Party business, Communists employ numerous, varied and elaborate precautions to protect themselves against surveillance and eavesdropping; but it is not within the scope of this paper to enumerate or describe the types of security measures so practiced.



VIII. COURIER

Courier is considered by Communist Parties everywhere to be a safe type of communication; and for years American Communists have made prime use of couriers to transmit important and vital messages and documents. Actually, operations of the Communist Party, USA, since its founding, have been sustained principally by courier communication.

Service Between USA and USSR

In the early days of the Party's life in the United States, special monies earmarked for explicit Communist activities in North and South America were brought by courier from Russia and were said to have been given into the custody of Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, first unofficial Soviet ambassador to the United States, who maintained an office in New York City.

During 1919-21, gold, precious stones and jewelry which had been confiscated from the Czarists during the Red Revolution of 1917 were smuggled into the United States by seamen, by American Communists returning from Russia, and by Russian agents and Soviet diplomatic officials entering the United States. Here arrangements were made to convert these valuables into cash. Later, about 1922, money began

to be transmitted to the American Communist Party by couriers and through cables. Among the techniques employed by individuals in bringing in actual money were the use of money belts and the secretion of bills in the frames of luggage.

J. Peters was reportedly a Comintern representative in the United States before World War II and remained an important figure in affairs of the Communist Party, USA, after the War. He was supposed to be expert in printing and photography. To facilitate filing and transportation, he allegedly photographed minutes of top Party meetings on 35 mm film. These minutes were then sent by Peters to Russia via Party members going abroad.


A well-informed source has described the courier service between the Communist Party, USA, and the Soviet Union prior to World War II. The courier system at that time was directed by William Weiner, a charter member of the Communist Party, and all couriers who operated in this system were under his jurisdiction. The one exception to Weiner's control seemed to be an individual known as Rudy Baker who apparently carried on his own courier work in connection with the Party's secret apparatus.

Couriers going from the United States to the Soviet Union would not disclose to one another what particular message or material

they were taking. In practically all instances, couriers arriving from the United States would ask for an appointment with the head of the secret apparatus of the Comintern. On a few occasions, couriers would ask for the chief of the Soviet cadre system, or some other Russian representative or department head to whom they wished to make delivery. Before the couriers were granted interviews by these Russian officials or allowed to visit Soviet buildings, the couriers had to be sponsored and introduced by the American Communist Party representative to the Comintern. Three or four individuals who went to Russia from the United States were not required to clear with the American representative but acted in their own stead. One of these persons was Alexander Trachtenberg, who was a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, and head of International Publishers.

International Publishers has been described as an "official publishing house of the Communist Party in the United States" by the Special House Committee on Un-American Activities in its report dated January 3, 1940, page 8.

Two types of couriers were used by the Communist Party, USA, one group being couriers utilized for a specific trip who did not return to Russia again; and the other group consisting of those comrades



... who went to stay for a period of time or went on some designated mission to Moscow. Both of these types of couriers had to be cleared by Weiner before leaving the United States.

Communists who journeyed to Moscow, whether they were leaders or mere rank-and-file members, would also ordinarily serve in the capacity of courier and take to the USSR all sorts of material and information destined for various Soviet officials and departments.

During the World War II period, American Communist Party leaders reputedly received Moscow's directives by hand from a courier who in turn had received them either from the Comintern representative or directly from the Soviet embassy in Washington, D. C. or the Russian consulate in New York City.¹

Seamen Service

In 1939-40, the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, assigned Roy Hudson, a National Committee member and the Party's National Trade Union Director, the task of organizing a group of seamen who could be trusted to carry out international assignments between various Communist Parties of the Comintern. At that time, the Communist Party, USA, was interested in creating an improved courier service throughout the United States in order to keep its activities unknown to Government

¹Budenz, Men Without Faces, p. 81.



investigators. New York was designated as headquarters and Hudson was leader of the eastern division.

All confidential communications were to be sent and received through this courier channel. Specific instructions issued for the use of couriers in contacting Hudson included the following:

(1) Arrival in New York

Before shipping out, the courier must advise as to the name of the hotel at which he would stop on his return. In an emergency situation, when the courier could not or should not announce his arrival in New York, and when it was undesirable to make any contact directly with the office, he was to send a telegram to a telegraph drop, stating in any form the day of arrival and the name he would use in registering at a hotel. Upon reaching the hotel, the courier was to remain there until contacted.

(2) Telephone Contacts

An urgent matter not to be handled by mail or direct call to the office required sending a telegram at least 24 hours before the intended call to a special telephone number. The text of the apparently innocuous telegram was to include the time of the proposed telephone call. For example, "Mother will arrive at 4 p. m. Wednesday" or "Will mail four books Wednesday," meant that the telephone call would be put through at four P. M. on Wednesday.

(3) Reserve Address

To discontinue the use of an address and to utilize a new one, a courier was to refer in any suitable way to the fact that it was no longer desirable to use the old one. For instance, he could simply say in a letter that he had moved to his "uncle's." This would indicate that the old address had been discontinued and the reserve address would be used thereafter.

(4) Return Address

A return address was to be used on the outside of the envelope, but it was not to be identical with the mail drop to which the reply was to be addressed.

(5) Change of Address

Since records of addresses no longer used were destroyed, when the use of an old, discontinued address was to be resumed, the complete name and address had to be furnished again.

(6) Type of Mail

Names of Party personnel were not to be used to identify correspondence pertaining to the Party. Great care was to be taken in the type of mail sent through the apparatus.

(7) Sealing of Letters

Envelopes had to be sealed with Scotch tape. Use of one envelope inside of another without such tape was held to be insufficient,

since substitution could prove simple, particularly if ordinary envelopes were used.

During the late 1930's and the entire 1940's, a courier service reputedly existed in the American merchant marine among Party members of the National Maritime Union and the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, both affiliates of the CIO. By means of this courier system, large quantities of Communist books, pamphlets and other forms of literature were placed in ships' libraries and distributed to Communist Parties overseas as propaganda by the Communist Party, USA. In addition, through this service, a considerable volume of official communications was exchanged between foreign Communist Parties and the Communist Party, USA.

Communist Party officials took no special care in selecting couriers to transmit Communist literature, and frequently entrusted such literature to seamen who were not even Party members. In general, no particular secrecy was maintained or practiced in transmitting literature. On some occasions, in order to get the material by customs at foreign ports, American Communist seamen would obtain the aid of non-Party seamen in concealing packages on their persons. Frequently, American seamen would bring back packages of literature and publications from abroad,



as well as sealed and unsealed envelopes containing messages and other correspondence destined for American Party leaders from foreign Communist officials.

The variety and volume of literature transmitted and exchanged by seamen couriers can be judged by the following two episodes. On the arrival of one American vessel in Manila, in December, 1946, Philippine authorities relieved crew members of a total of 19 different Communist pamphlets. In 1949, two American seamen visited headquarters of the French Communist Party in Paris and returned to their ship with approximately 50-60 pounds of Communist literature.

Specific techniques to conceal literature and material were normally left to the ingenuity and discretion of the individual courier. In many instances, considerable resourcefulness was exhibited by seamen in carrying Communist literature and material to and from foreign ports. One Communist seaman, during the early years of World War II, is said to have carried Communist literature into Australia and back to the United States by hiding it inside a small radio where searchers never thought to look. Another seaman reportedly smuggled reports of the British Communist Party into the United States by taping them to the bottom of his locker.

After the United States Coast Guard screening program of seamen was inaugurated in the Summer of 1950, Communist seamen

were reportedly ordered by Party leaders to refrain from taking Communist literature aboard vessels.

System Between USA and Canada

The Communist courier system which existed between the United States and Canada during the middle 1930's, has been described by a reliable source. Early in 1933, the district organizer for the Communist Party in the Buffalo area was picked by J. Peters and Earl Browder, the latter then General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, to work as a courier for the Communist Party, USA, between the two countries. He was introduced to a Canadian customs officer who was to be his contact and to whom he was to turn over material for transmittal to Canada.

After the system began functioning, the district organizer would meet the customs officer at appointed places in Buffalo and Niagara Falls, New York, and give him confidential packages he had received through mail drops in Buffalo. The packages turned over by the Americans were carefully sealed and at no time was he aware of the nature of the material he transmitted to his Canadian contact.

A second courier system was said to have existed between the United States and Canada at Detroit, Michigan. For security reasons, the Party would, from time to time, alternate between the two systems.



When the Detroit-Windsor, Ontario, system was in operation, no material was received at Buffalo, and the same appeared to have been true at Detroit when the Buffalo-Niagara Falls, Ontario, system was functioning.

Systems Since 1946-47

After 1946-47, the Communist Party, USA, refurbished already functioning courier systems and established new ones where none existed. In the last seven years, the Communist Party on a national and district scale has substantially increased and expanded its use of couriers while correspondingly curtailing its reliance on the telephone, telegraph, mail and other mediums of communication. Nowadays couriers are the principal means whereby directives, instructions and orders are transmitted between the top national hierarchy of the Communist Party and its district and local leaders. Party personnel in the Communist underground maintain contact with each other by courier, and contacts between open and underground members are similarly sustained.

Slowness

While courier is the most secure means of communication, it has one obvious and distinct disadvantage -- it is slow. That this has always been true, is evidenced by a highly confidential communication from

the Executive Committee of the Communist International which was read at a meeting on October 1, 1925, of the Political Bureau of the Workers (Communist) Party of America. The communication was dated July 11, 1925, and was received September 25, 1925. The delay was caused by the manner in which it had been forwarded. It was first sent by courier from Moscow to Berlin, and there forwarded by courier to the United States. The communication dealt with instructions of the Comintern concerning the development of a campaign for American recognition of the USSR, and the Soviet Government felt that if the communication should fall into the hands of some government authority en route to the United States, Russian interests would be jeopardized.

Twenty-seven years later, in the Spring of 1952, a written communication was in transit by courier for two weeks from the Michigan district of the Communist Party to National Headquarters.

Types

Communist couriers can be classified into four categories: (1) local, (2) state, district or regional, (3) national, and (4) international. Some couriers are "professional" or full-time, others part-time, and still others occasional.

Communist Party officials themselves have always acted as couriers on their trips both inside the United States and abroad.

When Benjamin Gitlow left Russia for the United States in 1927, he was given a sealed confidential letter for delivery to the organization department of the German Communist Party. Kitty Harris, the first wife of Earl Browder, is said to have served as a confidential messenger for Browder on important trips to all parts of the world.¹

Albert Blumberg, secretary of the National Legislative Bureau of the Communist Party, USA, in 1947 travelled throughout the nation contacting Party officials in various districts, primarily in connection with the Communist Party's interest in and support of the third-party movement. During his journeys, Blumberg is believed to have served as a courier in passing highly confidential messages.

According to a reliable source, since the end of World War II, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who is a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, has acted as a courier on her trips abroad to attend Communist-sponsored women's conferences of various kinds.

In many districts, Party office employees have been known to be entrusted with delivering messages and other important papers. Beatrice Zurawsky, currently bookkeeper at National Communist Party Headquarters and highly trusted Party member, has been utilized in the last few years to perform courier tasks for national officials.

¹ Gitlow, I Confess, pp. 329, 463-464.

Qualifications, Selection and Duties

The qualifications, selection and duties of couriers can be clearly shown by a study of the well-run underground organization of one of the largest Communist Party districts in the United States. Couriers in this particular district are never used without a complete verification and security check of their background, personal life and habits, characteristics, Party history, methods of work, relatives and friends, et cetera. Most of those ultimately chosen are young, politically well developed and of proven loyalty. All of them are relatively obscure and inactive in the Party. Many are women.

A paramount consideration governing the selection of couriers in this district is their availability and mobility. Those are preferred who are unemployed and available on a 24-hour basis; however, those whose jobs permit them to be available during the night or the day or whose work gives them a natural cover are also considered. It is of prime importance for a courier to have an automobile in order to facilitate the extensive travelling that he will be obliged to do. Virtually all couriers employ aliases or code names, usually a common first name only, e. g., "Bob," "Frank," "Ruth," "Al," et cetera.

Couriers in the district mentioned carry verbal messages as well as highly confidential information, orders, records, reports,



et cetera. In some instances, they handle financial matters.

Types of paper envelopes used by couriers in this district cover a wide range, but generally are of a cheap, easy-to-obtain variety. Abundant use is made of Scotch tape, and paper tape as well. The envelopes are often folded after sealing. A letter or mark is then written or drawn in ink or in pencil across a juncture of the edge and the side of the envelope to assist in detecting any attempt to open it.

Envelopes and packages, and communications themselves, invariably bear only the underground alias of the person to whom they are destined. Frequently, only the first initial of the alias is given. Inside a typical envelope there is ordinarily a cover sheet which lists by number and description the contents, each item in turn bearing a corresponding number.

Couriers in this district have been admonished always to remember the other person in drawing up messages and orders, and cautioned that scribbled handwriting, unclear wording and unwarranted assumptions can create more problems than imagined. They have been told that all orders should be read carefully, especially the date, time and place.



Security Precautions Practiced

Every conceivable kind of Party business is now transacted by courier within districts, between districts and between districts and the National Office: notices of meetings, membership and registration material, dues payments, literature, money, et cetera. Couriers transmit verbal messages and written material. In many instances, precautions are taken to conceal the contents of communications from the couriers -- usually by placing them in a sealed envelope. Couriers are instructed to make delivery as quickly as possible and not to have communications or material in their possession more than a few days.

Circuitous and involved routes are frequently employed by couriers in connection with their activities. In one weekly underground operation in a large Midwestern city in 1953, no less than three couriers were used. A left material and instructions at drop B. C made the pickup at drop B and turned over the material to D who was the principal courier in this operation. D appeared to have direct connection with the underground leadership and made his delivery directly to this leadership.

The process described above also operated in reverse, with D transferring material to C who placed the material in the hands of drop B. A picked up the material at drop B. A was believed to be in direct contact with another member of the underground leadership.



The key person in the afore-mentioned system was an old, trusted comrade who had previously been instructed to engage in no Party activity and to attend no meetings. He was not known in this particular locality. He usually made his pickups at night and was known to use the automobiles of other Communists.

Messages delivered by couriers have been secreted in many novel and ingenious ways: a note left in a mail box; a small capsule -- about the size of a medicine capsule -- containing a message, thrust unobtrusively into the recipient's pocket; a piece of paper placed in a laundry basket at a public laundromat; a message inserted inside a folded foreign language newspaper.

Couriers use all possible modes of transportation in their travels, although as a general rule public transportation is kept to a minimum for fear of recognition. Automobiles are the preferred means of transportation because of the mobility and privacy which they afford.



IX. RADIO

Comintern Radio Operators School

In the early and mid-1930's, the Comintern is reliably reported to have maintained and conducted a radio operators school in Moscow. This school was not part of the Lenin School, but was a separate institution under the control and supervision of the Comintern. Students went from various countries in Europe and Asia; some Americans also attended the school.

Americans who initially attended this school were said to have been unskilled in radio technique and operation prior to going to Moscow. Subsequently, upon completion of their training they proved incompetent, and in 1934 the Communist Party in the United States changed its policy and decided to recruit skilled radio technicians and operators and send them to the Soviet Union for "finishing."

Training at this school lasted approximately one year. Students were trained in the use of the Morse code, the operation of short-wave radio sets, the construction of such sets, and in various radio techniques essential to underground operations. At the conclusion of the course, each student was assigned short-wave call letters and was instructed to listen to Russian short-wave broadcasts at night over a specified frequency upon returning to his native land.

According to a former student, this radio system was not part of the Soviet espionage apparatus, but was designed to function in the interests of Communist Parties in the various countries. It was intended by the Comintern, this student indicated, that upon their return to their respective homelands, students should put short-wave radio sets into operation for the reception of messages from the USSR. This student also said that there was no discussion at the school, nor were orders ever given, to the effect that students should transmit information to Russia from the United States; and he was of the belief that the Comintern may have felt that the transmission of information via radio could have been easily traced by American authorities and thereby jeopardized Party members in the United States.

The school is said to have ceased operation in the middle 1930's.

Radio Communication System Considered

J. Peters allegedly held a general discussion at National Communist Party Headquarters in the Fall of 1948 concerning the possibility of using radio as a means of communication between National Headquarters and the districts. Peters claimed to have acquired extensive knowledge in the radio field through his work in electronics during World War II, and through a study of communication

methods practiced by the Communist Party of Germany during the Nazi regime. Peters is said to have discussed the merits and demerits of mobile radio transmitters and how they might be used and operated by trusted Party members who were amateur radio operators.

In the early part of 1949, Andrew Remes, Chairman of the Wisconsin Communist Party, was reported to have been directed by the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, to proceed to New York City for a special assignment. Remes was ordered to make a survey in the New York area as to the feasibility of establishing, among other things, a radio type communication system. Subsequent to his arrival, he told a New York State Communist Party official to purchase three Hallicrafters radio transmitting and receiving sets for the New York State Communist Party. This state official was also ordered to make a survey of radio "hams" in New York City and in New York State who were Party members; he was also directed to organize a training program to acquaint "hams" with the Hallicrafters sets. Remes stated it was originally planned that the National Committee would transmit messages and the district offices would be equipped to receive them.

One Hallicrafters set which was purchased was delivered to Harold Simon, New York State Trade Union Secretary of the Communist Party, who installed it in his home in New York City. Simon allegedly



made a complete study of the unit, of wave lengths, and of the set's possibilities. He also bought a telegraph key and studied and practiced its use. Simon supposedly was to train trusted Party members in his home.

In the Fall of 1949, John Williamson, who was National Labor Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, was reported as stating that the National Committee was exploring the possibility of radio communication between the National Office and the districts. He indicated that he was then in contact with competent radio engineers.

About this time, it is reported, Harold Simon learned that a Cleveland, Ohio, firm manufactured a radio transmitter for which no Federal Communications Commission license was required. Simon observed that if this set could be operated by means of a relay system, it could be used by the Communist Party. Simon indicated that in the event there was no communications system available to the Party for its underground operations, then this clandestine radio system could be utilized as an emergency measure. According to a reliable source, on numerous occasions in 1948 and 1949, Simon manifested great interest in the establishment of an underground radio network, but nothing concrete was done about it during that time.



J. Peters left the United States for his native Hungary in the Spring of 1949 under voluntary deportation. Andrew Remes and Harold Simon for several years have been reported to be in the Communist underground. John Williamson is now in prison as a result of his conviction in 1949 for violation of the Smith Act.

There is no indication that any system of radio communication was ever adopted or installed by the Communist Party in the United States.



X. CODES, CIPHERS AND INVISIBLE INKS

Cryptology -- the science of secret writing -- is one of the oldest forms of writing for through the ages men have used various devices to communicate secretly with one another. In diplomacy, war and crime, cryptology has played an important part.

A discussion of the technical and analytical aspects of cryptology is not proper in this paper. It is sufficient to mention that in the field of secret communications three systems are frequently used -- code, cipher and invisible writing.¹ All three systems have been employed by the Communist Party in the United States at one time or another during its history.

¹Code is a system in which a group of letters, words or numbers have an arbitrary meaning for brevity or secrecy.

Cipher involves messages in which the individual letters are disguised by substitution or transposition.

Invisible writing is accomplished by the use of sympathetic inks which become visible to the eye only upon the application of heat, water or chemicals. For example, lemon or onion juice, vinegar, or ammonia are invisible until heated.




Early Use of Codes

It is reliably reported that in the early days of the Communist Party, USA, its leaders received training by the Comintern in the use of codes. Codes were employed in transmitting messages both on a domestic basis and abroad. Official cables were sent to Moscow concerning American Party activities, some of which were sent in code and many of which were not, even though they carried some of the Party's most confidential matters.

In 1927, British authorities raided Arcos, the Russian Trade Delegation's offices in London, where they seized codes, documents, letters and files which revealed the identity of certain American Communist leaders who had received confidential letters, reports, cables and sums of money in the United States from the Soviet Union. As a result of this raid, new codes for the Communist Party, USA, were said to have been drawn up by the OGPU and the Comintern, and delivered by a Comintern official to a representative of the American Communist Party in Moscow who in turn brought them back to the United States.¹

¹Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General of the United States vs. Communist Party of the United States of America. (U.S. 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 41.) Subversive Activities Control Board. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953, p. 109.



These new codes were graded for confidential matters and for matters of utmost secrecy. The codes covering utmost secrecy were changed every three months, the others about every six months.

The top secret code was entrusted only to the head of the Communist Party, USA, and he in turn had orders to employ only one girl as absolutely trustworthy for decoding purposes. This code system was so intricate that a day's time is said to have been spent in decoding a short cable.¹

Current Use of Open Code

After World War II, according to a reliable source, J. Peters indicated that the Communist Party, USA, should consider utilizing a code system, but at the present time, no formal code or cipher system appears to be in use by the Communist Party in the United States.

Systems of codes and ciphers employed by the Communist Party, USA, in recent years have been of a relatively simple variety, the most common being the open code system and the key book pagination system. The Party, nationally and in the districts, currently makes use of an open code by which to safeguard its telephone conversations, its

¹Benjamin Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 148.



written communications and its records.¹

Messages hidden behind seemingly innocent and fatuous phraseology in written communications or telephone conversations by Communists generally pertain to such commonplace topics as personal health, family affairs or the weather. Such double talk is so worded that it conveys certain meanings which the writer and the recipient or the speaker and the listener understand because of their past knowledge, experiences and contacts.

The increased use of double meaning language in communications and conversations by Communists became evident after 1946-47. A member, as an illustration, would be apprized over the telephone of a meeting in such double talk language as "We are having a card party at Bill's house tonight," or a meeting would be referred to as a "bridge game," "pinochle" or "stud poker."

Double meaning language on the telephone, such as "The material you ordered will be ready on October 14" would indicate the date of the meeting. Similarly, phraseology like "The material is ready to be picked up" would show that the person wanted to be contacted.

¹Open code is the general term for the practice of concealing messages within apparently innocuous correspondence or conversation which may be accomplished in a number of ways: double meaning words and phrases, or cryptic words, letters or symbols, et cetera, which are prearranged to cover contingent situations.



While use of the telephone is generally frowned upon at the present time, it is recognized by the Party that in certain instances this medium is necessary and permissible. When such is the case, comrades involved work out a prearranged code. First names are used as code names which have been agreed to previously. Telephone drops and alternate meeting places are also decided upon beforehand when use of the telephone is contemplated. A prearranged code is devised for use in naming the date and time of meeting. For example, it might be agreed that when X calls Y and says he will see Y at 10 P. M. on April 25, this in fact, means that Y should either add or subtract a day or more from the date mentioned, and should add or subtract an hour or more from the time mentioned. From time to time, the code is changed by the individuals involved. There is no set rule in such matters, since the code is improvised and is left entirely to the discretion and imagination of the individuals concerned.

Typical of the innocuous correspondence resorted to by Communists is that which one Communist Party official in the northern part of one state wrote to another in the southern portion of the same state relative to arrangements for a meeting. The letter announced that "the usual monthly luncheon party" would take place at "the lovely little village on the coast with our dear sisters who live there." The letter



referred to the fact that "my brother-in-law shall be there, too, and will bring you the latest gossip and information about all our family doings. We hope you will be in a position to tell all our friends about your doings, too, as I know they are looking forward to hearing all about it.

The letter concluded: "May we also suggest that you proceed on north-ward as long as you are on the way, so to speak, and spend some time with the rest of the family, too?"

Code Names, Initials and Numbers

Prearranged code names are commonly used by Party personnel over the telephone and in written communications. Activities of underground organizations in all districts are now conducted through the use of code names, initials and numbers in place of a person's true name. Simple aliases like "Jack," "Helen," "Zeke," "Josh" and "Bob" are generally used by underground personnel. The chairman of one district was referred to as "Grand Exalted Ruler." One district organizer was called "The Rabbi." In another locality, club meetings were arranged by telephone with the caller saying "This is Number 3. We will meet at the previously appointed time at the home of Number 4."

Communist Party leaders in one southern state have been known to converse on the telephone for an hour about many different persons without once mentioning a name, referring only to these




individuals by initials, nicknames or brief descriptions, such as "the short fellow," "our good friend" or "the relative."

Foreign languages, especially Yiddish, have been spoken by Communists on numerous occasions, particularly over the telephone, to conceal what they were saying.

Address books of Communist Party leaders have been known to be kept in code as a protective device in the event the book is lost or falls into someone else's hands.

The postmark on blank post cards or envelopes containing blank sheets of paper have been known to be used as a means of notifying members of a meeting or some other event. The recipient knows from prearrangement that the actual date will be a particular interval after the postmark.

The postmark of an innocently worded post card has also served to alert a Party member of a prospective meeting. This particular post card was not mailed to the person destined to attend the meeting but rather to a mail drop. The middle initial of the person to whom it was addressed was changed to designate the person to whom the card was to be delivered.



Ciphers

In the past, the book cipher or key book pagination system has been a favorite method used by Communists to conceal messages.¹ This system was reportedly utilized from the mid-1930's until at least the beginning of World War II. Each district organizer, it is reported, used a different book in transmitting and receiving messages so that in the event one book fell into the hands of the authorities, the code would still be effective. The code books used at first were cheap fiction but later the Party commenced using little-known classics. The books for each district were changed every six months. There were no communications directly between districts, and a district desiring to send a message to another district would send the communication to the code center in New York City. This center, in turn, would recode the communication, using the same book as the district for which the message was intended.

As mentioned before, Leon Trotsky was murdered in Mexico by Frank Jacson in August, 1940, and thereafter efforts were made by Communists and Communist sympathizers in the United States and Mexico to free him from prison. In 1942-43, certain books were used

¹In the book cipher or key book pagination system, a number represents the page of the book, usually a classic or well-known book; a second number represents the line of the page, and a third number, the position of the letter or word on the line.



as key books to encipher communications passing between New York and points in Central and South America. These communications were transmitted for the most part through the mails and were written in secret ink.

Other forms of substitution cipher have been practiced by the Communist Party.¹ A former Communist Party functionary recalled having been given instructions at the Lenin School in the 1930's in the use of a mechanical cipher device in the form of a revolving alphabetical cylinder by which a message could be encoded and decoded. This cylinder mechanism was supposed to be a fast method of coding and decoding messages.

A substitution cipher was employed in connection with addresses contained in the material found in the California cabin in which Robert Thompson and Sidney Steinberg, both of whom were Smith Act fugitives, and others were hiding out when arrested by the FBI in August, 1953. One such notation was "Ed Harris, 0671 Apartment C, South Park Avenue, Tac." This address was determined to be nonexistent. However, it was ascertained that a married couple, both Communists, were living under the alias "Ed Harris" at 9447 South

¹The substitution method of cipher consists of a system in which letters or numbers are replaced by other letters, numbers or symbols.


Park Avenue, Tacoma, Washington. It was noted that if the figures one, two, three and four in sequence were subtracted from the address listed for Ed Harris, the result obtained was the actual address for Ed Harris.

Invisible Inks

Although a discussion of the technical aspects of invisible writing is not proper to this study, some mention should be made of secret inks as a medium of communication inasmuch as invisible messages are known to have been written on occasions in the past by Communists in the margins and between the lines of books, magazines, letters, et cetera.

At the previously mentioned radio operators school in Moscow, maintained and directed by the Comintern in the early and middle 1930's, a course was given in which students were instructed how to use lemon juice for secret writing and how to develop it with iodine.

As already noted, it was ascertained that letters written between correspondents in the United States and Mexico after the Leon Trotsky murder in August, 1940, contained over a dozen cipher messages in invisible ink written in English, Spanish and Russian.



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In 1950, a Communist Party organizer in the southwestern part of the United States allegedly stated that the Communists had perfected an invisible ink which could be made from alum, soda or citrus juice. He stated that it was advisable for Party members to prepare some secret ink in this manner and keep a fountain pen filled with it for emergency use. According to this official, the invisible writing could be made visible by pressing the paper with a hot iron. He also said that if a secret message were sent to someone in jail, the incarcerated person could bring out the writing by holding the paper up to an electric light bulb, thus subjecting the paper to heat from the bulb. In the Fall of 1950, this official reportedly instructed Party members in his area in this technique of secret writing.

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